In historical science and in mass media of Germany up to 80-x years, was considered conventional that Hitler's decision on attack to the Soviet Union was its consecutive result ideological "east program", directed on a gain of "vital space". Data on an origin germano - the Soviet war weren't called in question neither in historical literature, nor in materials of solid periodicals, radio and television.
The common position was reduced thus to the following thesis: "In June, 1941 preventive war, but - realization of its original, ideologically motivated intentions by Hitler which structure included traditional hegemonic requirements" began not. Attack to the Soviet Union happened in spite of the fact that since August, 1939 between Moscow and Berlin the non-aggression pact, and since September, 1939 - the treaty of friendship and border worked. However during period of validity of these contracts "third Reich" I didn't refuse the action program in the east, a gain of "vital space". Nazi Germany waged against the USSR the war of extermination caused political, economic and расово - ideological factors. This conclusion was based on results of numerous basic researches.
In historical science of Germany it wasn't called in question that the problem of motivation of the decision on war against the Soviet Union, made by Hitler in the summer of 1940, can be solved only in a context of long-term political goals of "the third Reich", namely: world supremacy of Germany. Result of researches of G. Weinberg, X. Trevor - Roper, E. Yekkel, A. Kuhn, A. Hilgruber about a foreign policy programme, the purposes of war and Hitler's strategy became everywhere a recognized conclusion that intention of "Fuhrer" to attack the USSR didn't follow only from a military situation of 1940, but - was its organic consequence of "east Program", developed till 1933.
Further historical researches proved: aggression of "the third Reich" was consecutive implementation defined still in 20-е years is more whole nazi than "east policy". The decision on attack to the USSR completely answered Hitler's stated in the main purpose "Main кампф" (1924) and in so-called. To "The second book" (1928), as well as in his statements after taking office of the chancellor in January, 1933. In Hilgruber's works are opened policy - the ideological purposes of war against the Soviet Union. The scientist came to a conclusion that "at Hitler's attack to the USSR couldn't be and speeches about "preventive war" in usual sense of this term, i.e. about "military operations which are undertaken with the purpose to precede or anticipate preparing aggression".
In 60-е - 70-е years occasionally in Germany were made attempts to claim that in an initiation of war against Stalin the crucial role was played not by Hitler's program installations, and developed voyenno - a strategic situation and "fraught with aggression" foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
Such installations were rejected as they contradicted known fundamental sources which unambiguously testified that Hitler's policy moved at all fear before Red Army . Supporters of the opposite point of view took marginal positions in the West German scientific world, however their publications got a considerable response in right radical circles to what considerable circulations of books of apologetic character testify.
In periodicals of neo-Nazi sense attempts to give out Hitler's aggression against the USSR for protection of Europe against the Bolshevism and to justify criminal acts National - the socialists, directed against Jews and Slavs didn't stop. Myths such nevertheless found reflection in the materials published from time to time on pages of specialized editions. One of military magazines of Germany claimed in 1985 that "the reflection of communistic threat proceeding up to disembarkation of British and Americans in the west of Europe" was "the main merit of the German soldiers who were at war in Russia".
During 1986 which has begun in the summer in Germany of "dispute of historians" in conservative mass media there were discouraging materials in which Wehrmacht attack to the USSR was called as "preventive war" that answered long aspirations of the right nationalist circles to rethink nature of the operation "Barbarossa". Newspaper articles on a perspective so-called."preventive war" caused numerous responses, thus Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union it was treated as one of the most important steps of "Fuhrer" during world war.
Renewal of debate about "preventive war" conceals in itself danger of distribution of false ideas of an aggressive policy National - socialists and washing out of borders between the conclusions containing in publications of authors - apologists and in works of serious researchers. New attempts of a justification of the German aggression were regarded in Germany and behind its boundaries as extremely dangerous that found, for example, reflection in reports on the international symposium which was carried out by Fund of a name of I. Virt in Essen in March, 1987
The conservative forces, seeking to create the new concept of national history, didn't reject already more unconditionally the thesis about "preventive war". Nazi dictatorship and policy of Moscow were treated from now on as quite comparable historical phenomena. Theses of professor of the Berlin Free university E. Nolte about direct causal interrelation between Auschwitz and "the archipelago GULAG" caused extremely fierce polemic and became the beginning of "dispute of historians". Discussion was integrally connected with intensive searches new, more positive "the German national identity".
Not that within "dispute of historians" attempts of a justification of the German aggression against the Soviet Union were made was casual also. To the statement of "positive identity" obviously stirred that germano - the Soviet war of 1941-1945 in any way didn't give in to attempts of its stylization under war fair, national and defensive. Namely such war in the east" in trivial militaristic literature appeared ". Special emphasis was thus placed on events of 1944-1945
To formation new positive "the German national identity", undoubtedly, "stirs" existence of indissoluble communication between war against the USSR and so-called "a final decision of a Jewish problem". Certainly, it is impossible to consider casual what on July 31, 1941, at the moment of victorious euphoria of Wehrmacht and a nazi mode, рейхсмаршал Goering sent to the chief of head department of imperial safety R. Geydrikhu the written directive "carry out comprehensive organizational and material preparation for a final decision of a Jewish problem in a zone of the German influence in Europe".
By scientists of Germany it is incontestably proved that destruction of the Jews deported from all continent, along with Hitler's expansion in the east, was the most important component of a racist course National - a socialism. Both purposes belonged to the same program. Systematic, planned, industrial destruction more than six million European Jews in a ghetto and death camps in the east of Europe - the integral component of World War II launched by Germany. Especially serious crime is active participation of connections of Wehrmacht and their command in Hitlerite to "destructive war" in Eastern Europe.
As some historians seek to design as it does to Nolta, "causal interrelation" between Auschwitz and "the archipelago GULAG", it is necessary to point to impossibility to break off two criminal aspects of a Hitlerism once again: massacre of the European Jews and war which was waged for the sake of "vital space in the east". To deny historical fault for an initiation of war against the USSR, wars racist in essence, it is equal as for Holocaust crimes, it is represented which - to whom considerable easier business if thus to call nazi crimes by "the compelled actions" or to explain them with fear before potential "Asian punishment".
All this at all didn't exclude a particular interest of conservative circles to distribution of treatment of the German attack to the USSR as "preventive war", as occurred in a course of "dispute of historians". Arguments of supporters of this speculative version were borrowed from the book of the astriysky philosopher E. Topich "Stalin's War", and also from publications of the frayburgsky historian I. Hoffman and the former officer of the Soviet investigation V. Rezun acting under a pseudonym V. Suvorov.
The thesis as if "the political sense of World War II is reduced to aggression of the Soviet Union" against the western democracies was a wreath of statements of Topich who and actively acted before in conservative journalism, and the role of Germany and Japan consisted that they served as the military tool of the Kremlin. Topich came to an absurd conclusion that the Soviet management allegedly "itself provoked" Hitler to attack that "to appear before the whole world as the aggression victim ". Suvorov's hypothesis about as if 1941 preparing by summer Stalin's attack on "the third Reich" was stated at first on pages of the British military of the magazine (in 1985), and then (in 1989) in the book "Ice breaker".The supporter of the similar version is also Hoffman. In his opinion, in 1941 there was the last chance to anticipate "Stalin's aggressor", planning in 1942 to attack Germany. Hoffman claims that "the offensive configuration of Red Army" constituted "strategic danger", and the Soviet foreign policy of the eve of war was got by "invariable aggression".
Topich's speculation, as well as nothing Suvorov's confirmed creation, had no impact on scientific researches, however got a response in the conservative press. Published in August, 1986 in the Frankfurter to the Algemayena newspaper signed by the publicist of Gilessen the article "War of Dictators" gained imaginary persuasiveness: it turned out that in the summer of 1941 two aggressors faced with each other. Recognition of correctness of such design would conduct to reconsideration of a being of the plan "Barbarossa" and to removal from Germans of charges (having, according to Gilessen, only "propaganda character") in a breach of the peace with the Soviet Union. The aspiration to restore former "an image of the enemy", to use a ghost of "Asian punishment" for formation of "new national consciousness" is available.
Gilessen's article caused a set of contradictory responses. The TV reporter L. Rosh who has called his approvals by "the cock-and-bull stories taken from stuff", with alarm stated: "Will pass a little time, and we will hear from these misters that Hitler's attack to the Soviet Union was only a preventive action. But after all on this thesis protection strategy was based on the Nuremberg process". Really, Topich and G.'s conservative publicist - K. Kaltenbrunner hastened to come to conclusion, as if new researches are capable to adduce "serious arguments for confirmation of that not only Hitler sought for expansion of vital space in the east, but at the same time and Stalin prepared counterattack". Thus, however, the reservation became: "for the present there are no exact scientific proofs of that the Russian approach really was preventive war".
Whether there was a speech about Stalin plans of attack for Germany in 1941 either in 1942 or about "proofs" about which it was spoken above, business was that under the guise of the analysis "psychological" or "the psychologist - political" factors the attention of readers consciously distracted from racist ideological "east program" a nazi Reich.Hitler appeared not as the aggressor seeking for captures of "vital space", and as the politician, "compelled" to react to Stalin's aggressive actions. By means of the thesis about "fair preventive war" National - socialists turned into saviors European 3апада - "абендланда" from the Bolshevism.
At such approach it is obviously possible to force out "undesirable" scientific conclusions from public consciousness or it is simple - напросто not to take them into account. It is characteristic: historians and publicists of conservative sense tried "not to notice" so important scientific source, as the diaries of Goebbels published recently which all contents serves as the incontestable proof of original aggressive intentions of Hitler in relation to the USSR.
To the address of the German scientists who are speaking out in defense of historical reality, on pages of right radical editions charges in "were distributed to hostility to national interests" while publications of Gilessen, Topich and their adherents caused immediate and full approval in the right part of a political range of Germany. The right extremist magazine "Natsion Oyropa" which and insisted before on the version of "preventive war", wasn't slow to print sympathetic responses of those former participants of "east campaign" which are in camp "eternally yesterday's". Here that now positions of the researchers polemizing with attempts of revision stories of World War II, were called "pro-Moscow" was new only, and the term "anti-fascism" appeared contradicting a being of "new national identity".
There was, thus, a danger of an erosion of the dividing line between conservative and neo-Nazi installations which, according to professor G. Mommsen, "becomes more and more indistinct". This danger understand and in conservative camp. Summing up the results of "dispute of historians", Gilessen noted in February, 1987 that his statements about the Soviet plans of attack for "the third Reich" don't mean a consent with the nazi propaganda version about "preventive war" and don't call into question the fact of the German aggression against the USSR. But at the same time on pages of right radical editions materials of supporters of the modified thesis about "preventive war" were considered as direct confirmation of former nazi propaganda installations.
According to an assessment of the historian A.The maple, for the West German society installations which "were until recently under the sign of a taboo became "accepted" and were considered extremist" 38 }. It is necessary to think of that similar process was characteristic and for perception of fascist ideology certain intellectual circles on a final phase of history of the Weimar republic.
The noisy advertizing campaign was launched in 1987 in connection with a publication of the book of Nolte "The European civil war of 1917-1945" in which it was claimed (naturally, without proofs) that the German aggression against the USSR was "a component of objectively reasonable and decisive fight". As for the thesis about "preventive war", Nolte considered it admissible, though "demanding additional proofs". In scientific community arguments of the publication of Nolte were recognized as the unacceptable.
The one who suggests to reconsider being considered indisputable historic facts, has to, obviously to show the sources confirming new interpretation. But in a case with installation about "preventive war" there were no new documentary materials. Hilgruber in 1982 convincingly disproved "revisionist" interpretations, characterizing them as "return to treatments which are recognized outdated".
In modern scientific publications the thesis of nazi promotion about preventive nature of war of nazi Germany against the Soviet Union is consistently disproved. Can be examples V. Benz's book about Hitlerite "war of extermination" and work B. Piyetrov - Ennker about the Soviet foreign policy of 1940-1941 in which unacceptability of designs of Topich, Hoffman and Suvorov is incontestably proved.
The German historians in details considered contents of the speech of Stalin on release of the Soviet military of academies on May 5, 1941 as this text was considered by "revisionists" as the proof of plans of approach of Red Army to Germany, allegedly planned for 1942. Still various versions of the Stalin speech, among them record at second hand, and also the short option taken from the former Central party archive are in use. As the Russian researcher L.A. Bezymensky and the German experts B. Piyetrov - Ennker and the B. Bonvech believe, available texts don't give the chance of an adequate assessment of intentions of Stalin concerning Germany, at least before when more exact record of the speech will be published.
New works about Hitler's outlook and his political goals (among authors it is necessary to call R. Tsitelman) confirm a conclusion that "the gain of vital space in the east was among constants of the Hitlerite program". However Hitler was presented in Suvorov's book "Ice breaker" by "the performer of will of Stalin", managed, however, having launched war, to outstrip the Kremlin dictator. Suvorov's speculative statements caused sharp criticism in the scientific environment. In Topich's new publications the version about "Hitler's compelled war" though data are provided in the biography of Stalin written by the Russian military historian D. A. Volkogonov (left also in German) that in May, 1941 Stalin rejected the project of the Soviet General Staff, suggesting to undertake preventive counterattack of Red Army against the German armies preparing aggression repeated. Among supporters Topich and Suvorov - the Austrian historian of X. Magenkhaymer who attributed Wehrmacht aggressions certain "preventive functions".
It is characteristic that the important problem is thus ignored significantly: whether the German politicians and military proceeded from need to anticipate Stalin in 1940-1941? But as there are no proofs to that representatives of nazi elite considered necessary to strike "preventive strike", more or less risky assumptions of Stalin's policy were used, but plans and Hitler's motives thus were absolutely ignored. It turned out that nazi "Fuhrer" conducted, itself without suspecting about it, preventive war against the USSR.
The "Modified" versions about "preventive war" have no scientific value, they are deprived of a documentary basis and didn't find support in serious historical literature on World War II perspective to what, for example, the contents of several collections with the international participation testify, devoted 50 - to the anniversary of attack of nazi Germany to the Soviet Union. Works of the Russian authors D. A. Volkogonov and V.D. Danilov translated into German, contain new data that on May 15, 1941 the national commissioner of defense S. K. Tymoshenko and the chief of the General Staff of K. Zhukov submitted the plan of preemptive blow of Red Army on preparing for approach to the USSR to Wehrmacht forces ("Reasons according to the plan of strategic expansion of forces of the Soviet Union on a war case with Germany and its allies").Value of this document is often exaggerated, that Stalin forbade further study and implementation of the plan as he sought to avoid any provocations in the relations with Berlin isn't taken into account.
Supporters of the version about "preventive war" remain in obvious isolation, however they have ample opportunities for publications in conservative editions. It is necessary to assume that the right circles on - former will use World War II history for return to "an image of the enemy", for revival "fear before the East" that has to, in their opinion, serve formation of "positive German national consciousness" and "special German identity".
But attempts of audit of a being of aggression against the USSR have nothing in common with historical science. Hitler's war is as I called it in one of the early works Nolte who didn't have analogs in the modern history "the terrible aggressive war directed on enslavement and destruction of the people", and it can't be given out backdating for fair, defensive war of Wehrmacht against "empire of evil" or - after nazi promotion - to treat in quality "a crusade of Europe against the Bolshevism" to carry on tradition "national - the European ideology".
The thesis about "preventive war", belonging to "the newest falsifications of history, has to exempt Germans from the feeling of fault forced out from consciousness", from responsibility for an initiation of war against the Soviet Union. The researcher of Hass again convincingly confirmed existence of indissoluble communication between "war in the east" and "a final decision of a Jewish problem".
Is evident that in the latest publications F. Becker and V. Mather Hitlerite aggression against the USSR is called "as defensive fight of Europe against the Bolshevism", and to Stalin preparation of grandiose offensive operation code-named the "Thunder-storm" allegedly provided on the middle of July, 1941 is attributed. From the point of view of Mather, Hitler as if only at some o'clock outstripped Stalin. Both authors don't produce any evidence of the version that concerns also Hoffman, Suvorov and Magenkhaymer. Documents available to researchers from the Moscow archives don't contain any convincing data on Stalin's offensive plans which beginning was planned for August, 1939 or for summer of 1941 (Suvorov even designates "exact" date - on July 6, 1941).Such statements don't follow from the plan of promotion of parts of Red Army offered by Zhukov and Tymoshenko to the area советско - the German border.
The authors called above lose sight that "Reasons" of the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff, as well as the re-deployment and strengthening of concentration of armies of Red Army on the Western direction represented reaction of professionals on recorded by the Soviet party and passing since fall of 1940 Wehrmacht promotion to borders. Seeking to prove essentially offensive character of actions of Red Army, supporters of the version about "preventive war" address to a perspective of the Soviet military doctrine, strategy of Red Army and character of its arms in 1920-1941. Results of these researches don't raise doubts, but nevertheless don't confirm a hypothesis that the attack plan on "the third Reich" in 1941 directly follows from unambiguously offensive character of the Soviet military doctrine.
Stalin didn't allow resolutely any provocative actions concerning Germany not to give to Hitler a reason to an initiation of war. Therefore he also didn't pay attention to preventions of the German attack - numerous and proceeding from the most different sources. Adherents of the thesis about "preventive war", summarizes Bonvech, their arguments have no evidential base, the Bochum historian notes, "are in poor shape ".
Discussion about the Stalin plan of attack for Germany (which existence is doubtful) moved meanwhile to Moscow. The German experts write even about "the Russian dispute of historians ". Debate finds reflection in Germany mainly on pages of provincial periodicals. The historiography of Germany separates from the.spekulyativnykh of statements as long ago it is already established that the course on capture "vital space in the east" was the main thing in Hitler's plans, in his political and ideological installations. It is possible to be surprised only to in what degree supporters of the thesis about "preventive war" ignore long ago already existing results of researches about nazi policy of preparation of world war.
R. Schmidt writes about Stalin plans and actions of spring and the beginning of summer of 1941 as about "the failed multiple strategy". The historian recognizes that the Soviet dictator "steadily sought to stand aside from the conflicts", though after flight of River.Hess to England it was possible to come to a conclusion that London and Berlin already united on the basis of common interests, and at Hitler are given a free hand for war against the USSR. And still Stalin stopped activity of alarmed military, sharply rejected the plan of anticipatory actions developed by them and continued a policy of appeasement in relation to "the third Reich".
Hypotheses of possible long-term Stalin plans of anticipatory war can't remove aside the fact of historical responsibility of Germany for treacherous attack to the USSR in any way. To recognize this obvious truth doesn't mean at all to deny insidiousness of policy of Stalin during World War II or to approve his terrorist mode of what willingly accuse opponents of a hypothesis of "preventive war". It is necessary to resist actively as aspiration to force out truth from historical memory, and to attempts of a justification of the social evil. It is necessary, at last - that, to admit the fact of the German aggression against the Soviet Union and functional interrelation between a Holocaust and the operation "Barbarossa" that on the following possible round "dispute of historians" didn't arise again convulsive searches of new arguments in favor of assumptions of a "fair" preventive strike or of "defensive mission" Wehrmacht.
It is absurd to accuse opponents of such versions of repetition of former postulates of the Soviet historiography. The main thing consists that the German aggression meant for the Soviet people of loss more than 40 million citizens and for this reason it is so necessary to find reconciliation ways to build mutual understanding bridges between our people. Truthful interpretation of the events connected with preparation of the German invasion and with as "destructive war" in the east has to serve the solution of this task, the ideological and which social reasons are inseparably linked with actions of ruling circles of "the third Reich". This concept was cornerstone of the "War against the Soviet Union" exhibition prepared by the Berlin historians to 50 - to the anniversary of the German aggression, and also the War of extermination exhibition organized in 1995. Institute of social researches (Hamburg), the public which has caused the widest response of Germany.
The evangelical church of Germany considers insistently necessary to learn lessons from "history of crimes of Germans against the people of the Soviet Union".This basic conclusion is based on results of scientific researches of the historians, testifying that war against the USSR "was planned and carried out as total destructive war of aggression" which purpose there was a capture "vital space in the east".