"We can be useful to you …"

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Intelligences of the USSR and Czechoslovakia closely cooperated among themselves from the middle 1930-x years. Thus some researchers claimed that the Soviet party became the initiator of rapprochement of reconnaissance services of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic. But whether so it was actually? Allow to open unknown details of the past the documents of the Russian state military of archive declassified recently.


On May 16, 1935 in Prague it was signed советско - the Czechoslovak contract on mutual aid. Immediately it ratified in Moscow and Prague. This agreement positively affected strengthening of ties between armies of two countries.

So, at the end of May in the Soviet Union accepted delegation voyenno - air forces of ChSR headed by the divisional general Yaroslav Fayfr. On May 31 he visited the Central aero hydrodynamic institute, scientifically - research establishment of the aviation industry of the USSR. In the evening, after visit to TsAGI, in conversation with the Soviet colleagues Fayfr declared the following: "We are surrounded from all directions with such countries as Germany, Poland, France, well we know that becomes in these countries. Information on Germany as telling on - German the Czech can't be distinguished from the aboriginal of Germany is especially good at us. We could share these data on Germany with you if it is required".

In the report on conversation the people's commissar of defense Kliment Voroshilov marked off these words of the general a red pencil. Probably, it was very first or one of the very first proposals of Czechoslovaks.

During big maneuvers of the Kiev military district (on September 12-17) and after them (on September 24) the chief Razvedupra of RKKA Semyon Uritsky several times met the colleague, the chief 2-го department of the General staff of Czechoslovak army the colonel Shimon Drgach and the chief of the General staff general Ludwik Krejci. They persistently offered the Soviet Union cooperation in the field of investigation against Germany.

Having begun on maneuvers with hints "on need of more close connection between intelligences of the USSR and ChSR", Drgach eventually told directly: "At the request of the head. KREJCI'S General Staff - I do you an official proposal about an exchange of secret-service materials across Germany" and further reported which - that about opportunities of the department: "We, Czechs, have huge opportunities to work in Germany, we know the language in perfection, many German officers are connected with Czechoslovakia - have there lands, relatives and other communications. Our people will very easily acclimatize at Germans; at last, we widely use the German emigration which hates a Hitlerite mode … We have, in my opinion, very quite good sources on ground and air forces of Germany which - that we have in the German chemistry, we have nothing on navy and very little across East Prussia".

"Earlier, - the colonel continued, - we most of all worked against Hungary, now Germany for us in the forefront. We share data on Germany with French, and about Hungary - with Yugoslavia and Romania". But thus I noticed: "It is very dangerous to Romania to give a secret-service material, they have many selling types".

Desire as soon as possible to come to the agreement, in practice to begin an exchange of materials and to adjust mutual aid induced Czechoslovak scouts the first to provide to the Soviet party some information available for them. During conversation of Drgach I reminded the interlocutor that it transmitted already through the Soviet military attache in Prague Yemelyanov - Minium part of the data got by them about the German aircraft "to lay the foundation to an exchange of materials". Also I declared readiness to provide all these data completely but provided that also Razvedupr will share with 2 - m department information on Germany. In that case the colonel was ready even to specify personally responsible officer in the German Ministry of aircraft who is its source.

Drgach and hinted at the possible help in the organization in Germany of "diversionary service" for the USSR, just that they already did then for France. "Now, when business promoted to war, - explained Drgach, - we found out that at French isn't present absolutely in Germany of diversionary service. At the request of French we adjust to them, we help to adjust more true, creation of diversionary cells on the railroads and the military enterprises". Also I added: "… You, Russians, with your investigation are put in not less difficult situation, than French.We know how it isn't enough at you the people knowing languages, and with what work your people will acclimatize abroad".

The speech and about the German communists came. The chief of Czechoslovak military investigation noticed that it is quite clear to him why the Soviet colleagues don't use them, after all "among them the Gestapo got many provokers". On what Uritsky "with limit external expression of sincerity" told that the main cause of failure from work with members of KPG in other: "I categorically declare to you that our government won't suffer and will finish with each of us who would take in head to use in the work the help of foreign communists". Actually, as now it is well known, such work was conducted constantly, without looking even at a ban of the Politburo of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks).

I didn't ignore Drgach and activity of the Soviet investigation in its country. "We know that you ceased to conduct for a long time illegal investigation against us. We note it with appreciation, and you, probably, at all don't represent as we highly appreciate this manifestation of loyalty. But for work against Germany it is difficult for you to do without Czechoslovakia, at least only as starting or intermediate point. Therefore, having refused work against us, it is necessary to take the following step - to work together".

It is known that, having started cooperating with the USSR, 2-й the department of GSh ChSA refused joint long-term work with Poles against the Country of Councils. Дргач gave also other example such: the illegal bureau of English investigation in Prague was engaged in prospecting activity against Germany and the Soviet Union. "My agency, in 2-е bureau enters also counterintelligence, opened this bureau. I called to myself the English colonel heading the Prague illegal bureau "Intellidzhens Service", and suggested it to be legalized in the work against Germany …, as for their work against the USSR, I pointed to all inconveniences of similar work from our territory". Uritsky's attempt to specify nature of the specified activity of British wasn't crowned with success, "Drgach directly told that more anything about it can't tell".

To RO ChSA told by the head the chief of the General staff Krejci added that after the welcome accorded to them, "better which anything can't be presented", there can be no obstacles for cooperation of investigations of two countries - "this natural and most intimate contact of both armies". The general once again emphasized: "I think, we can be useful to you in the general fight against the general enemy.Germany - our general enemy, it is necessary to fight together. Our prospecting opportunities against Germany are that that we their completely can't use".

And it passed to the concrete moments of possible exchange of information which in Uritsky's report Voroshilova were emphasized. "So, somehow will be to the NATIONAL COMMISSIONER - or we give each six months everything materials available for us across Germany, and you to us the. Or, on a model of our work with France, each 6 months serially you come to Prague and Moscow and Drgach and you make collaboration in exchange of information … We can be useful to you and in other, namely in resending your people and their legalization in Germany. In a word, and I and DRGACh at your order".

During alleged interaction Czechoslovak military counted on "mutual 100%-ny frankness" and high level of privacy of all enterprise, having offered the chief of RU following: "Except you personally and except your head of the Gen. of a staff and the PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR nobody has to know about an exchange".

Again the question "about a mutual exchange of data on armies", and also "about an exchange of trainees" the military attache of ChSR in Moscow the colonel Frantisek Dastikh who has visited Department of external relations of Razvedupr in November, 1935 put. Thus, having requested some data on RKKA, he reported that the Soviet military attache Yemelyanov - Minium, "except for the most confidential things, has opportunity to see and receive everything that he wants". So it, probably, also was as the people's commissar of defense agreed to transfer to the General staff of ChSR answers to all its questions.

After visit of Prague in December, 1935 the deputy chief of Razvedupr of RKKA case commissioner Artur Artuzov the cooperation agreement was approved and in new 1936 passed into the practical plane.

The Soviet envoy in Czechoslovakia Aleksandrovsky informed the people's commissar on foreign affairs Maxim Litvinov on February 14, 1936: "Lately Prague visited from among our military t. Artuzov on office affairs and t. Uborevich journey to holiday. The first told me that he received a lot of things from Czechs and in general is very happy with the arrival".


On March 15, 1939 Hitlerite armies occupied Czechoslovakia. London where the group of Czechoslovak scouts led by Frantisek Moravts got over on the eve of invasion became one of the main communication centers of intelligences of the USSR and ChSR.Adjusting work on a new place at once in many directions, they created communication lines and with the Soviet colleagues.

The chief of sector of investigation 2-го department of a Czechoslovak General staff the colonel Emil Shtrankmyuller remembered: "Already on March 16 or 17 we met the military attache of the Soviet embassy in London the general - the major Cherny in the apartment of our military and voyenno - the air attache colonel Kala. In the presence of all special military group including me, the colonel Moravets told the general Chernom about the latest events in Czechoslovakia and I acquainted him in brief with our mission. I promised that will transfer it results of prospecting activity 2-го department against nazi Germany in the form of the conclusion of our research group. After we received the materials which were brought from Prague by the major of the British investigation Harold Gibson, we several times met this Soviet representative in his apartment or at the colonel Kala".

Further interaction of two allied investigations was carried out with mediation of the military attache and the resident in London Sklyarov, the military attache of the major (then the lieutenant colonel) Sizova and the adviser - the envoy, and also the resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence Chichayev, consisting at allied (Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) the governments in Great Britain. Shtrankmyuller told many years later: "Information "Dandies" (employee of an abver Paul Tuemmel. - V. K.) and we transferred other results of our prospecting activity to the colonel Sizov who regularly visited us. Sizov or his colleague Chichayev compared our materials to information available for them, estimated it from the point of view and conclusions told to our people. The president Benesh personally transferred especially important data to the Soviet ambassador Maysky".

To it it is necessary to add that the colonel Moravets, some researchers claim, was enlisted by the Soviet military investigation and worked under the pseudonym Baron. And its department possessed opportunities considerable - and in the occupied territory of Czechoslovakia, and in other countries, and not only Europe. The set of important information arrived from it to Moscow. Semyon of Tymoshenko, the people's commissar of defense of the USSR in 1940-1941, remembered: "In London I received reports of our military attache always at once as soon as they arrived. Were there and data which were transferred to us by Czechoslovak intelligence service.Without any exaggeration has to tell that some of them seemed improbable and even provocative. However our verification of these messages and time showed that in most cases it was a question of truthful and surprisingly exact information".

In some cases cooperation with Moravts's people was carried out on a place, as, for example, in Sweden (Chaslavka), Romania (Peak), Yugoslavia (Giyeke - Stand, Gyyurich), Turkey (Peak, Kumposht), Switzerland (Sedlachek), Iran (Giyeke - Stand). Besides, in the ranks of Moravts's London service there was, at least, one more Soviet military scout - Bedrich Biyekhal in which transfer to the west in 1939 - the m was engaged personally "Director" - the chief 5-го RKKA Managements Ivan Proskurov and his skilled employee Maria Polyakova. Bedrich and his wife kept in contact with the Center by means of a handheld transceiver. After war it was awarded the order Soviet Patriotic war 1-й degrees (1966).

Cooperation of the Soviet investigation and with military groups of the noncommunistic Resistance Movement (RM) in Czechoslovakia was expanded. Communication with certain people and DS groups was supported by the staff of Consulate general of the USSR in Prague Mokhov (Mikhaylov), Yakovlev, Beer (Conrad). They were engaged in it personally or through intermediaries.

Mokhov's subordinate the head of the Soviet prospecting group in 1937-1941 the major of Czechoslovak military investigation Rudolf (or Josef) Jedliczka (Rudi) was one of such intermediate links. In anticipation of war the major received from the resident a handheld transceiver, codes and the broadcast schedule (a call sign "Magda"). Besides own information it transferred to the data Center from scouts and the DS organizations, including connected with the Czechoslovak government in emigration. Among them one of the WITHDRAWALS largest military organizations (UVOD - the Central management of the Resistance movement in the country).

In the telegram to the president Benesh to London (on July 30, 1940) heads of WITHDRAWAL called Jedliczka "our major, the good Czech on their service". Interaction of WITHDRAWAL and one more PVVZ military group (PVVZ - Council of five "We will remain are true") with residency of the Soviet military investigation becomes closer since summer of 1940. To it the meeting of one of eminent persons of a resistance movement of the lieutenant colonel Josef Balaban ("Bogush") with the representative of the Soviet investigation ("attache"), probably, preceded the attache on the press of consulate general of the USSR, the assistant to the resident Curt Beer.It assured Balaban that the Soviet Union is interested in restoration of independent ChSR and maintenance of the friendly relations between two countries. As for советско - the German conflict, it is already close and it is necessary to prepare for it. "Attache" offered the cooperation program in the field of investigation which provided transfer of data on the German prospecting network and the agents acting against the USSR, about a dislocation of the German military units and establishments in protectorate, about military production at the Skoda plants, ChKD, Zbroyovka, and special attention it was necessary to pay on new types of tanks, creation of crossings to Germany through the Sudetes for the Soviet scouts, establishment reliable express and radio communications about the USSR, scheduling выброски parachutists and the weapon, sabotage actions in case of the conflict, direct cooperation of the Soviet and Czechoslovak scouts in Germany.

From this extensive plan of action practically it was succeeded to carry out not everything, in the protectorate territory exchange of information appeared the most effective. WITHDRAWAL told to the Soviet colleagues data that war against the USSR will begin in the second half of 1941, and approach will be preceded by powerful blow of aircraft. It was reported also about a transfer of armies to the east, in places of concentration of the German army. Among these documents there were quite exact data on number and character of military equipment, on fuel and other materials which were transported on the protectorate territory. Information on preparation of nazi approach on the Balkans was valuable, about the German espionage to the USSR, etc. on June 6 and 14 new data on preparing attack of Germany are transferred to 1941-guo Rudolph to the Soviet Union. It agrees to one of reports of April 27, nazis forbade plzensky Shkodovka to send production made for it to the USSR and to a distance there are one and a half months on completion of financial transactions of the Soviet orders.

Data to Rudi arrived since May 1939-го and from the prominent historian and the publicist, the large figure of a noncommunistic resistance movement Yaroslav Papoushek (God) who in 1936-1938 contacted to the Soviet military investigation within Razvedupr's confidential cooperation of RKKA with 2 - m department of a Czechoslovak General staff. The big help in underground work including as coherent, it was rendered by his wife - Nadezhda Papoushkova - Melnikova. After war Benesh wrote (1948) that Popoushek was one of the best sources of information on preparation of war by Germany against the USSR.


On January 12, 1941 to Istanbul from Moscow unexpectedly there arrived the lieutenant colonel Ludwik Svoboda, the former commander of the Czechoslovak legion created from soldiers and officers of ChSA in Poland, being at war with Germans in the territory of this country and interned in the USSR. Together with it to Turkey there arrived the person, which Svoboda presented to the military attache of Czechoslovakia in Turkey (and to the head of Czechoslovak military investigation on the Balkans) to the general Gueliodor Pique as "the general Fokin - the representative of the Moscow center". Negotiations on cooperation of reconnaissance services in anticipation of советско - the German war were the purpose of visit.

Whom there was a messenger of the Kremlin? Some clarity in the matter was brought by the Czechoslovak scout Frantisek Giyeke (Stand). Remembering the Istanbul episode, he told the following: "At that time I was sick and was treated in the Istanbul hospital. Soon after arrival Svoboda visited me there and reported that to Istanbul there arrived the chief of the Soviet intelligence service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs general Fokin".

More exact name of this position till February 1941-го - the chief 5-го (foreign) department of GUGB People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs USSR. And I occupied it then as now it is known, Pavel Mikhaylovich Fitin. About what he visited then Turkey, tells also such fact: subsequently Phytin awarded with the diploma "For Liberation of Czechoslovakia" which was written out addressed to the general Fokin and it is signed by Freedom.

Negotiations began already next day and proceeded till January 23. In them participated from the Soviet party Phytin and vice-the consul in Istanbul Vershansky (probably, Lev Petrovich Vasilevsky), with Czechoslovak - Geliodor Pika and his deputy Prokop Kumposht. The main offers made by "Fokin", according to reports of Czechoslovak scouts, concerned arrival in Moscow Czechoslovak voyenno - prospecting mission, "that under the direction of the Soviet general staff to organize investigation on the Czech lands, on the Balkans and in Germany", and also to create in the territory of the USSR military units from Czechs and Slovaks ("when the international situation" will allow).

The Soviet general asked to hurry with the answer as attack of Germany to the Soviet Union, according to him, "can become reality within several months". Phytin expressed confidence of what its country will inflict defeat over the German fascism and will release "the Czech people".

About what I there was a speech in Istanbul, eventually, was carried out.Mission headed by the general Pika began the activity in Moscow at the end of April of the same year. But official it became only after July 18 1941-го when in London it was signed советско - the Czechoslovak military agreement. The Czechoslovak military unit (1-й a separate battalion - 1-I separate crew - 1-й the army case) is created at the end of 1942, and since March 1943-го it participates in fights on Great Patriotic War fronts. And in 1945 - m the Red army frees Czechoslovakia.


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